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Abstract
(First draft, please do not cite).Behavioral imperfections are the
rule, not the exception. This is true for human behavior, for decision-
making process, and for problem-solving process. The world is com-
plex, with a lot of frictions. Humans have limited physical resources,
bounded cognitive abilities, psychological biais which distort their eval-
uation process and their motivations to search. Human preferences and
beliefs are inconsistent. Motivations to act can be unconscious, or rather
vague, or too low (depression) or too high (impulsive). Goals are ill de-
ﬁned, not well set. Human knowledge is incomplete, inadequate. Agents
cannot digest all the information they receive each day. They must choose
to ignore some part.In our world, frictions, bias, errors, anomalies, are
everywhere. Imperfections can be of various types:(i) Cognitive imperfec-
tions: lack of knowledge, which is the main limitation for decision (cogni-
tion limits).(ii) Psychological imperfections which is the main problem for
well directed motivation to drive action properly. They include goal set-
ting imperfections, frustration feelings, unclear goals, impulsive behaviors,
emotions bias.(iii) Physical and physiological imperfections: inertia and
frictions (limited physical and physiological resources, Rumelt, 1990).The
goal of this paper is to explain and formalize incremental decision-making
process in real life settings.We characterize the eﬃciency loss of an in-
cremental behavior in the context of an environnement which presents
inertia-reactivity costs. To save space the other two main frictions, goal
setting costs, and knowledge acquisition costs are not examined.We con-
sider the “worthwhile to move” principle of incremental behavior, which
we model as folows. In each step, the agent, before moving, and after
exploration around the current state, compares intermediate advantages
and costs of change. The agent is supposed to have a long term goal and
limited needs. Each step, the agent chooses between (a) doing the same ac-
tion as before, and (b) changing. He will move if the advantages to move
are greater than some fraction of costs of moving move. This dynamic
and reference-dependent incremental cost-beneﬁt behavior leads to local
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1actions and converges, if the agent’s local costs of moving is suﬃciently
high. If the agent is more goal oriented (wants to “improve enough” at
each step), the process shrinks (i.e., the diameter of the state-dependent
“worthwhile-to-move set” decreases to zero ), and reduces to one state if
the goal function does not jump upward. The process ends in a permanent
routine or a trap, where the agent prefers to stay there in spite of some
residual frustration for not having reached his ﬁnal goal. Eﬃciency losses
c o n c e r nb o t ht r a n s i t i o np a t h s ,t h eﬁnal state and the ﬁnal goal. The agent
uses qualitative enclosing heuristics to choose how much to explore around
and to bound his control variables locally. The transition process is made
of a punctuated succession of static exploration-exploitation phases, and
dynamic moving phases. Each step, the process jumps from one tempo-
rary routine phase to an improving temporary routine phase, following
am o v i n gp h a s e ,u n t i lﬁnally reaching some behavorial trap, a perma-
nent routine, or even worst, a rest point lower than any local maximum.
Convergence in ﬁnite time occurs if the agent chooses a ﬁnite total ex-
ploitation time.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
The goal of this paper is to explain and formalize incremental decision-making
process in real life settings.We characterize the eﬃciency loss of an incremental
behavior in the context of an environnement which presents inertia-reactivity
costs. To save space the other two main frictions, goal setting costs, and knowl-
edge acquisition costs are not examined.
We consider the “worthwhile to move” principle of incremental behavior,
which we model as folows. In each step, the agent, before moving, and after
exploration around the current state, compares intermediate advantages and
costs of change. The agent is supposed to have a long term goal and limited
needs. Each step, the agent chooses between (a) doing the same action as be-
fore, and (b) changing. He will move if the advantages to move are greater than
some fraction of costs of moving move. This dynamic and reference-dependent
incremental cost-beneﬁt behavior leads to local actions and converges, if the
agent’s local costs of moving is suﬃciently high. If the agent is more goal ori-
ented (wants to “improve enough” at each step), the process shrinks (i.e., the
diameter of the state-dependent “worthwhile-to-move set” decreases to zero ),
and reduces to one state if the goal function does not jump upward. The process
ends in a permanent routine or a trap, where the agent prefers to stay there
in spite of some residual frustration for not having reached his ﬁnal goal. Ef-
ﬁciency losses concern both transition paths, the ﬁnal state and the ﬁnal goal.
The agent uses qualitative enclosing heuristics to choose how much to explore
around and to bound his control variables locally. The transition process is
made of a punctuated succession of static exploration-exploitation phases, and
dynamic moving phases. Each step, the process jumps from one temporary
routine phase to an improving temporary routine phase, following a moving
phase, until ﬁnally reaching some behavorial trap, a permanent routine, or even
worst, a rest point lower than any local maximum. Convergence in ﬁnite time
occurs if the agent chooses a ﬁnite total exploitation time. The model is able
to describe a full range of behavior, moving from hill-climbing local behavior, to
intermediate goal setting behavior which seeks to“improve enough” each step,
intermediate satisﬁcing process without too much sacriﬁcing, problem-solving
process (bounded rationality), a theory of needs and wants, routinization and
habituation process, and ﬁnally traditional global optimization (substantive ra-
tionality) where all frictions have disappeared.
We emphasize the role of psychology and cognition to balance between mo-
tivation and fear of change, and the importance of speed in decision-making
for reactive behaviors. We explain links with optimization and approximate-
optimization theory, variational inequalities (the Ekeland variational princi-
ple and others), proximal algorithms, local search hill-climbing algorithms and
global search models.
32 From Incrementalism to Instrumentalism to
Optimization
In a world with frictions, a ﬁrst incremental principle, the “worthwhile to move”
principle, can handle the realistic case of an incremental decision-making process
where the agent tries, each step, to do a little better than before. We show,
adding an instrumental (goal setting) principle, called the “improving enough”
principle, how our model can handle a huge variety on intermediate goal setting
behavior.The traditional case of optimization is at the other extreme of this
range of behavior, in a frictionless world.
In the Real World, Frictions are the Rule, not the Exception Be-
havioral imperfections are the rule, not the exception. This is true for human
behavior, for decision-making process, and for problem-solving process. The
world is complex, with a lot of frictions. Humans have limited physical re-
sources, bounded cognitive abilities, psychological biais which distort their eval-
uation process and their motivations to search. Human preferences and beliefs
are inconsistent. Motivations to act can be unconscious, or rather vague, or
too low (depression) or too high (impulsive). Goals are ill deﬁned, not well
set. Human knowledge is incomplete, inadequate. Agents cannot digest all the
information they receive each day. They must choose to ignore some part.
In our world, frictions, bias, errors, anomalies, are everywhere. Imperfections
can be of various types:
i) Cognitive imperfections: lack of knowledge, which is the main limitation
for decision (cognition limits).
ii) Psychological imperfections which is the main problem for well directed
motivation to drive action properly. They include goal setting imperfections,
frustration feelings, unclear goals, impulsive behaviors, emotions bias.
iii) Physical and physiological imperfections: inertia and frictions (limited
physical and physiological resources, Rumelt, 1990).
Incremental Behavior: Balancing between Intermediate Advantages
and Costs of Change Because imperfections are everywhere, most of our
behavior is incremental. We work step by step, using small improving steps
and local improving actions, local exploration devices, trials and errors.... We
assupose that at each step, an agent balances between local advantages and
local costs of moving. Incremental aspects are context-dependent and reference-
dependent. The reference state is the current state.
Choosing to Change or to Stay Choosing is a dynamic process. The sim-
plest way to choose between a given set of alternatives is to make a cost-beneﬁt
analysis, to compare advantages and costs, loss and gains, of each alternative.
The basic unit of choice is comparison between a pair of options. The traditional
optimization theory pre-supposes a known choice set of alternatives. The agent
who wants to ﬁnd the best alternative takes a pair of alternatives, compare their
4advantages and costs over a list of criteria, rejects the alternative that has the
less favourable balance between advantages and costs. He is supposed to do the
same for each pair of alternatives, in one shot. Non-rejected alternatives will be
chosen. This process of comparisons is not viewed as sequential.
In a more realistic sequential choice process, successive eliminations make the
process of choice state-dependent, because choosing is between a new alternative
and the existing state. The comparison process is anchored to previous choices.
Choosing must consider repeated choices, with the possibility to change his
choice from one period to the next. Very often, to choose to stay, is the reference-
dependent choice. The possibility of repeated choices matter much if we consider
every choice as a dynamic process. This leads to the concept of temporary
routines where the agent repeats the same action during some time, and changes
from time to time, moving from one temporary routine to a new temporary
routine, to ﬁnally ending in a trap, a permanent routine, or a ﬁnal choice.
Incremental Intermediate Goal Setting Behavior If, because of lack of
knowledge, an agent cannot optimize, he must explore around the current state
to discover his local environment to try to improve each step. This is a local
search optimizing process (hill-climbing). If the agent wants to improve his
motivation to try to “improve more and more quickly” each step, he can set
intermediate goals (intermediary aspiration levels) to help him to drive his ex-
ploration process to “explore enough” but “not too much” . This is the “gradual
satisﬁcing” process of Soubeyran A (2006), without inertia and frictions, (see
also Martinez-Legaz JE-Soubeyran A, 2002).
If there are inertia forces (“costs of moving”), the agent must do more to
sustain his intermediate motivation: he must “improve even more” each step
to be able to compensate intermediate costs of moving, by intermediate “ad-
vantages of moving”. Then, it is “worthwhile to move”. This is a way to limit
intermediate sacriﬁces. This process leads to local action in an endogenous way.
Local action is not an hypothesis as it is for a high climbing algorithm, it is
now a consequence of inertia. It leads to convergence if the agent “improves
enough”. The process converges to a rest point (trap, routine) if the agent
“improves more than enough” each step.
Modelizing the Inter-related Aspects of a Decision Making Process
Our model examines why agents do something or not, and how they choose to
do it. Their choices concern both actions and “ways of doing”. Agents can
choose to do nothing. They can choose to repeat what they have done before,
or can choose to change. The reference point is “what and how” things where
done before.
Our model shows that a behavior has at least six interrelated characteristics:
1) Incrementalism aspect,
2) Instrumentalism aspects
3) Local exploration and search aspects
54) Qualitative aspects, using economizing (fast and frugal) heuristics to lo-
calize and enclose the process and cut the cost regression paradox ( to “know
how to know how..”.). In the context of a complex world of radical uncer-
tainty, we do not use probabilities, but rather set inclusions, i.e., inequalities to
modelize the degree of ﬂexibity, fuzziness and adaptation of a behavior,
5) Punctuated dynamical aspects: where transitions matter, because they
are necessary to reach the ﬁnal goal ( a succession of jumps from a temporary
routine to an other temporary routine).
6)Finally our model can incorporate without much eﬀort physical, physio-
logical, psychological, cognitive, and social features of a behavior.
Main Findings: Behavioral Implications Our model deﬁnes a general
“adaptive decision and making” behavior by linking in a unique framework
complementary “motivation building”, goal setting, “exploration around” and
moving (changing, learning) tasks. In this paper we emphasize ﬁrst the inertia
context for incremental behaviors, then, the goal setting and inertia contexts
for intermediate goal setting behavior. To save space we do not explore (!) very
deeply the determinants and characteristics of the local exploration task (the
information and knowledge acquisition process).
Our ﬁrst goal is to modelize in a very simple way these incremental process
of decision and making as a succession of balances (comparisons) between state
dependent intermediary advantages and costs to change, with respect to inter-
mediary advantages and costs to stay.
Using a topological approach, we show tha, if the state space is a metric space
(only a proximity concept is needed, no concept of direction is required), if the
per unit of time utility (valence) is bounded above, and if the agent can enclose
his “worthwhile to move relation” within a reﬂexive and transitive enclosing
relation, putting bounds on his control variables, by choosing, each step, a
not-too-long exploitation period, using a minimum per-unit-of-distance eﬀort of
moving, taking a not-too-low sacriﬁce index, putting not-too-high weights over
temporary contentment and deception, then:
a) for a low-goal-oriented process where the agent follows a “worthwhile
to move” dynamic and just wants to improve step by step, the “worthwhile to
move” relation has the local action property, is nested, and the process converges
to some state if the state space is complete. It converges in ﬁnite time if the
agent spends a ﬁnite time for exploitation and the speed of moving is high
enough
b) for a higher-goal-oriented process where, starting from a given initial state,
if the agent follows a “worthwhile to move” dynamic and “explores enough”
around the current state to be able to “improve enough”, the process not only
converges, but shrinks and ﬁnally stops at a trap (a rest point) where the agent
prefers to stay than to move again. Routines represent a speciﬁce x a m p l eo f
traps where an agent stops thinking before doing.1
1There are very few papers showing the formation of routines. In this context our paper
generalizes to a procedural framework the speciﬁc exploration-exploitation process of rou-
6Calibrating Imperfections and Ineﬃciencies: How far from Optimiza-
tion do Agents Behave ? Our model can help to estimate, in a given con-
text, the departure of a given behavior from the standard formulation of an
optimization model. It helps to calibrate the size of the ineﬃciencies. This will
give us a tool to know when, depending of the context, the “as if hypothesis”
is justiﬁed, i.e., when optimization is a good enough approximation of a given
behavior. To succeed in this goal our model must
i) modelize lack of knowledge, frictions and goal setting ineﬃciencies. This
problem will become more complicated when we will introduce inertia ineﬃcien-
cies.
ii) deﬁne dynamic ineﬃciency indexes, i.e., to calibrate the ineﬃciencty gaps
of a behavior with respect to its substantive formulation.
iii) link the ineﬃciency gaps of a behavior to the anomalies (characteristics)
of both the agent and his environment (the context).
Concerning an inertia context (costs of moving), ineﬃciencies indexes will
include also the total costs of moving (i.e., the total energy spent along the
process, or the size of intermediate sacriﬁces), the mean speed of moving. Several
quality-cost ratio can be deﬁned.
At a more mathematical level, our model gives a cognitive proof of the
celebrated “epsilon approximation theorem” or variational principle” of Ekeland
(Attouch H-Soubeyran A, 2006 ). It also provides a general framework to study
up-to-date general proximal algorithms (Attouch H- Bolte J, 2006, Attouch H-
Redont P-Soubeyran A, 2006) and second order dynamic optimization models
with memory (Attouch-H- Goudou X and Redon P, 2000, Attouch H -Soubeyran
A, 2006).
From Behavioral Imperfections to Behavioral Traps and Anomalies
We study whether all these dynamically interlinked behavioral imperfections
converge. What are the kind of behavioral traps where the process can gradu-
ally move? Let us list some of them: path dependency, lock-in eﬀects, aspira-
tion traps, local maximum, high climbing traps, irregular dynamics, stop-and-go
process of static and dynamic phases, routinization process moving from tem-
porary routines to permanent routines, intermediate goal formation to help to
sustain motivation.Optimization will appear as a pure limit special case, when
all imperfections are ignored.
3 Incrementalism: “Worthwhile to Move” Prin-
ciple Helps to Bound Intermediate Sacriﬁces
The material for this section will be made available at the seminar.
tinization of Sinclair-Desgagné and Soubeyran (2000) which use a traditional optimal control
model. They show the formation of routines when, each period, an agent takes beneﬁto fb o t h
learning by thinking (exploration) and learning by doing (exploitation and learning).
74 The Punctuated “Exploitation-Exploration and
Moving” Process
The material for this section will be made available at the seminar.
5 A Topological and Tychastic Approach, Using
Inclusions
This section will be made available at the seminar.
6 Incrementalism via Enclosing
This section will be made available at the seminar.
6.1 Using an Enclosing Heuristic to Enclose the “Worth-
while to Move” Inclusion
6.2 More on Incrementalism: Convergence in Finite Time
Enclosing Using an enclosing heuristic we can show, as we have done for incre-
mental behavior, that the “worthwhile to move” process exhibits local actions,
local moves, convergence of the goal (per unit of time utility), and convergence
of the states if the state space is complete. We consider now convergence in
ﬁnite time.
7 Instrumentalism: Improving Enough and Shrink-
ing
We consider now a more goal-oriented “worthwhile to move” process (more than
just improving) where, in an inertia context, the agent wants both
i) to follow a “worthwhile to move transition” y ∈ W(x)={A(x,y) ≥ ξ(x)C(x,y)}
where, during the transition, the agent must compensate intermediate costs by
intermediate advantages that are are higher than a given fraction of costs, i.e.,
where sacriﬁces are low enough during the transition,
ii) and to “improve enough”, i.e., meeting the intermediate satisﬁcing level,
g(y) − g(x) ≥ ε(x).
We will show that if (a) the per unit of time utility function is bounded above,
and (b) the agent has been able to enclose the ”worthwhile to move” inclusion
y ∈ W(x) within an enclosing inclusion y ∈ S(x), then such a “worthwhile
to move” and temporary satisﬁcing process will shrink, i.e., the radius of the
enclosing inclusion, radiusS(xn) ≥ 0, converges to zero. Hence the enclosing
inclusion shrinks, and so does the “worthwhile to move” inclusion.
87.1 Improving Enough
Intermediate “Improving Enough” Behavior Consider ﬁrst a more ori-
ented goal-setting process which does not follow a “worthwhile to move” process.
This deﬁnes an intermediate satisﬁcing process where the agent wants to “im-
prove enough” (see Soubeyran A., 2006). Each step, say starting from x ∈ X,
the agent sets ﬁrst a new aspiration level b g(x) >g (x),t h e ns e t sa na d j o i n ts a t i s -
ﬁcing level e g(x),g (x) < e g(x) < b g(x), and tries to reach it. To succeed, he must
e x p l o r ew i t h i na ne x p l o r a t i o ns e tE [x,r(x)] ⊂ X around x ∈ X to ﬁnd some
y ∈ X such that g(y) ≥ e g(x). Finally, at each new step, the agent will adapt
his aspiration level. Let g =s u p{g(y),y∈ X} < +∞ be the ﬁnite supremum of
the bounded above per unit of time utility function g(.). To save space, suppose
that the agent sets a feasible aspiration level, b g(x) ≤ g<+∞. If not, he will
not reach it and, sooner or later, will be obliged either to explore more around
the current state, or to relax his aspiration level.
Both “Worthwhile to Move” and “ Intermediate Improving Enough”
Behavior Suppose now that the agent follows both i) a “worthwhile to move”
and ii) an intermediary satisﬁcing (improving enough) process. Then, the agent
follows a worthwhile to move process y ∈ W(x). Suppose that he has suc-
ceeded to enclose it within the enclosing process y ∈ S(x). By exploration
around the current state, the agent will discover locally his utility function
as well as the enclosing inclusion S(x)={y ∈ X,g(y) − g(x) ≥ θd(x,y)}.L e t
s(x)=s u p {g(y),y∈ S(x)} ≤ g<+∞ be the highest unknown aspiration
level that the agent can reach within the enclosing inclusion. Let b g(x)=
g(x)+p(x)[s(x) − g(x)],p (x) > 0, be the unknown relation between the aspi-
ration level b g(x) and s(x).
Starting from any x ∈ X,i ti sa l w a y sp o s s i b l et oﬁnd an “improving enough”
and “worthwhile to move” state y ∈ S(x) ⊂ W(x), such that g(y) − g(x) ≥
σ(x)[s(x) − g(x)],0 <σ<σ (x) < 1,because of the deﬁnition of s(x) as a
supremum.
7.2 Shrinking
Let radiusS(x)=s u p{d(x,y),y∈ S(x)} ≥ 0 be the radius of the subset S(x) ⊂
X. Then, s(x) − g(x) ≥ g(y) − g(x) ≥ θd(x,y) for all y ∈ S(x) implies that
s(x) − g(x) ≥ θradiusS(x). We are now prepared to show how the worthwhile
to move process will shrink.
A “Worthwhile to Move” Behavior which “Improves Enough” at
each Step Shrinks Suppose that, at each step, the agent ﬁnds xn+1 ∈
S(xn) ⊂ W(xn) which improves enough, i.e., such that g(xn+1) − g(xn) ≥
σ [s(xn) − g(xn)].
The Shrinking Proposition:
Suppose that the per unit of time utility function is bounded above. Suppose,
as before, that the agent has succeeded to deﬁne and enclose his worthwhile to
9move process. Suppose ﬁnally that, each step, the agent explores enough around
to be able to ﬁnd xn+1 ∈ S(xn) ⊂ W(xn) which improves enough, i.e., such that
g(xn+1) − g(xn) ≥ σ [s(xn) − g(xn)] ≥ 0.Then, the worthwhile to move process
shrinks, which means that the radius radiusW(xn) of the worthwhle to move
set converges to zero.
Proof:: g(xn+1)−g(xn) ≥ σ[s(xn) − g(xn)] ≥ θradiusS(xn). We have seen
that a worthwhile to move process is such that g(xn) −→ g∗. This implies that
radiusS(xn) −→ 0,n−→ +∞.
Remark: Here we have instrumentalism: the goal changes along the process,
because the unsatisﬁed needs b g(xn) − g(xn) change (decrease) each time.
8 Convergence Towards a Trap: Stopping with
no Residual Frustration
In this section we want to know in which cases the agent prefers to stop mov-
ing, with no residual frustration feelings, because at the end of the process his
aspiration gap will vanish: b g(x∗) − g(x∗)=0 .
Behavioral Traps (Stable Routines) As seen before, a performance x∗ ∈
X is said to be a behavioral trap, or a stable routine if, for any y ∈ X with
y 6= x∗, it is not worthwhile to move from x∗ to y.T h i s i s e q u i v a l e n t t o s a y
that x∗ ∈ X is a rest point element of the ”worthwhile to move” relation x ∈ X
7−→ W(x) ⊂ X, i.e., W(x∗)={x∗}. In this case, the agent has no further
incentives to move.
The Worthwhile to Move Theorem Suppose that the state space X is a
metric space with metric d, a the instantaneous utility function g(.) is bounded
above, and the agent uses an enclosing heuristic which encloses the worthwhile
to move inclusion y ∈ W(x),W(x)={y ∈ X,A(x,y) ≥ ξ(x)C(x,y)} within the
inclusion y ∈ S(x),S(x)={y ∈ X,g(y) − g(x) ≥ θd(x,y)},θ>0. 2
Then, the worthwhile to move (but, for the moment, not satisﬁcing) process
y ∈ W(x) can be enclosed within the nested enclosing process y ∈ S(x):W(x) ⊂
S(x),for all x ∈ X.Let xn+1 ∈ W(xn),n∈ N and xn+1 ∈ S(xn),n∈ N,x0 ∈ X
g i v e n ,b et h ew o r t h w h i l et om o v ea n dt h ee n c l o s i n gp r o c e s s .
a) If the state space is complete the worthwhile to move process converges,
xn −→ x∗ ∈ X,n −→ +∞ whatever the starting state x0 ∈ X.I t c o n v e r g e s
in ﬁnite time if, along the process, the total time spend for exploitation is ﬁnite
2This means that the agent puts limits on the following choixe variables (controls): he sets
a maximum lenght of exploitation 0 <t (y) ≤ t, a minimum per unit of time eﬀort of moving
e(x,y) ≥ e > 0 and a minimum rate of non sacriﬁcing ξ(x) ≥ ξ > 0. He also puts maximum
weights over contentment and deception, and 0 ≤ δ(x) ≤ δ. Then, the acceptable transition
ratio is higher than a strictly positive level, θ(x,y) ≥ θ>0, where the minimum acceptable
transition ratio is θ =( ξe)/
k
t(δ
l
> 0.
10and the speed of moving v(x,y)=d(x,y)/t(x,y) is higher than a strictly positive
level.v>0.
b) If the worthwhile to move process is ”improve enough”, which is always
the case if the agent ”explores enough” around, each step, the process not only
converges, but also shrinks: radiusS(xn) −→ 0. If the per unit of time utility
function is upper semi continuous, then, the limit state x∗ ∈ X i sat r a p( a
routine): S(x∗)={x∗} =⇒ W(x∗)={x∗}.
The agent will stop moving at x∗ ∈ X and has no residual frustration:
b g(x∗)=g(x∗).
The “Clairvoyance Theorem” (Clear-sightedness Theorem) Suppose
that, each step, the agent chooses the same radius of exploration r(xn)=r>
0,n∈ N. O u rr e s u l ts h o w st h a ta f t e rs o m eﬁnite time the worthwhile to move
set will lies inside the exploration ball of constant radius, because the radius of
the worthwhile to move set skrinks to zero. Then, after a ﬁnite time the agent
will optimize.
This is a very powerful result which shows when, under inertia frictions , an
agent optimizes.This help to understand the degree of validity of the ”as if ”
hypthosesis (even if agents do not optimize, the substantive approach says: we
suppose that it is as if agents optimize ).
9C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Inertia is everywhere. Our approach modelizes intermediate goal -etting behav-
ior with inertia. It can be seen as a local search optimization model in an inertia
context which makes local action a result, not an hypothesis. It adds an inter-
mediary goal setting process which helps to built a bridge between local search
models and global search models of renforcement learning, via a deterministic
exploration-exploitation and moving process, in an inertia context.
The synoptic power of our model is that it articulates in a dynamic way
around the exploration-exploitation trade oﬀ, three main blocks: goal setting
(motivation-exploitation), exploration (search, knowledge and information seek-
ing), and moving (inertia, reactivity costs). Our model is related to a huge list
of decision and making models, static and dynamic model of decisions, and then,
dynamic models of decision and dynamic model of decision and action, either
deterministic or stochastic.
What matters is the interrelation between three blocks : goal setting, mo-
tivation and exploitation, exploration (knowledge and information acquisition),
and changing (costs of moving, learning).
Our model considers the case of a large state space case (not compact).
It adopts a toplogical view, the very general case of a metric space, with no
directions. It can be easily extended to a quasi metric space. Our model anchors
each step, decision and action, actions changing the context of decision each step.
11Appendix 1: Links with Regularization Theory for Ill Behaved
Problems
Available upon request
Appendix 2: Links with Local and Global Search Optimization
Algorithms
Available upon request
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